Executive Summary
"X's new location feature exposed thousands of 'patriotic American' MAGA accounts operating from foreign countries like Russia, Thailand, and Nigeria."
X did introduce a location transparency feature in December 2025. NewsGuard research confirmed some foreign-based accounts spreading misleading claims. However, the feature itself has accuracy issues, showing recent travel rather than actual base. Both real foreign influence and feature limitations exist.
What Actually Happened
1. The Feature Launch
In early December 2025, X (formerly Twitter) introduced a new location transparency feature designed to show users the geographic location associated with accounts. According to TechCrunch's interview with Head of Product Nikita Bier, the stated purpose was to "verify authenticity" and "limit influence of troll farms and coordinated inauthentic behavior."
The feature uses a combination of IP address data, device location services (if enabled), and account metadata to determine location. Reuters reported that the feature initially rolled out to verified accounts and high-engagement political accounts before expanding platform-wide.
2. The Foreign Account Discovery
CBS News analysis identified several accounts that presented themselves as "patriotic Americans" supporting MAGA ideology while showing locations in Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa. NewsGuard's comprehensive research documented specific examples:
Documented cases include: Accounts posting about U.S. election integrity from Thailand, immigration commentary from Nigeria, and Second Amendment advocacy from Eastern European countries. NewsGuard flagged approximately 200 accounts showing this pattern of geographic-ideological mismatch, many with substantial followings (10,000+ followers).
The Accuracy Problem
VPN and Travel Confusion
AP News investigation revealed significant accuracy issues with the location feature. The system showed locations based on recent login activity rather than account origin or primary residence. This created false positives where:
Legitimate U.S. users appeared foreign when traveling internationally or using VPN services for privacy. Business travelers, military personnel stationed overseas, and digital nomads were frequently misidentified. Actual foreign accounts could mask location by using U.S.-based VPN services or compromised residential IP addresses.
The DHS Account Incident
A viral claim alleged the official Department of Homeland Security account showed an Israel location. Both DHS and X issued statements denying this, stating it was a fabricated screenshot. This incident highlighted how location data could be manipulated or misrepresented for disinformation purposes.
Foreign Influence Operations Context
To understand this issue properly requires context about documented foreign influence operations. Graphika's 2025 Foreign Influence Operations report and the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab have extensively documented coordinated inauthentic behavior on social media platforms.
Known tactics include: Creating personas that match target audience demographics, using stolen or stock photos for profile images, posting about divisive domestic issues to amplify polarization, and building follower counts through engagement pods before switching to political content. These operations are well-documented and predate X's location feature by many years.
Real Problem, Imperfect Tool
Foreign influence operations targeting U.S. political discourse are a documented reality. However, location data alone is an unreliable indicator. Sophisticated operations use U.S.-based infrastructure, while legitimate Americans abroad can appear foreign. Behavioral analysis (posting patterns, network connections, content coordination) is more reliable than IP geolocation.
Bottom Line
X did introduce a location transparency feature in December 2025, and NewsGuard research documented accounts with geographic-ideological mismatches. However, the feature has significant accuracy issues, showing recent travel and VPN usage rather than actual base location. Foreign influence operations are real and documented, but location data alone cannot distinguish between foreign operators, traveling Americans, privacy-conscious VPN users, or compromised accounts. The claim is technically true but missing critical context about the tool's limitations.